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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-3283
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
        v.
DAVID A. HOUGH, JR.,
                     Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00002)
District Judge:  Honorable David Stewart Cercone
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 3, 2008
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 21, 2008 )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, David Hough pleaded guilty to one count of
knowingly receiving visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  The District Court sentenced Hough to sixty months’
2incarceration, followed by five years of supervised release.  Hough appeals his judgment
of sentence.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
In June 2004, agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation executed a search
warrant at David Hough’s residence and seized his computer and hard drive, which
contained images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  On January 3, 2007, a
grand jury returned a two-count indictment, charging Hough in Count One with
knowingly receiving visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and in Count Two with knowingly possessing visual
depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B).
Hough entered into a written plea agreement with the Government in which he
agreed to plead guilty to Count One charging him with a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2).  The offense carried a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of five years’
imprisonment; consequently, the Presentence Investigation Report calculated the federal
Sentencing Guidelines recommendation, originally thirty-three to forty-one months, to be
sixty months’ imprisonment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1.  Under the plea agreement, the
3Government agreed to withdraw Count Two.  Hough agreed to waive his right to appeal
the District Court’s sentence, except if the Government appealed from the sentence, the
sentence exceeded the statutory limit as stated in the United States Code, or the sentence
unreasonably exceeded the federal Sentencing Guidelines range.
At the District Court sentencing hearing, Hough did not contest the length of the
statutory mandatory five-year minimum, but instead requested that the sentence be split
between incarceration and home detention with electronic monitoring.  The District Court
sentenced Hough to sixty months’ incarceration, followed by five years of supervised
release.  One of the conditions of the supervised release is that Hough is prohibited from
associating with children under eighteen years of age, except where a responsible adult,
approved by Hough’s probation officer and aware of Hough’s background and offense, is
present.  Hough did not object to this condition at the hearing.
Hough timely appealed the District Court’s judgment of sentence.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over Hough’s case pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Hough’s appeal, even though he agreed to
an appellate waiver in his plea agreement.  United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203
(3d Cir. 2007).  However, we may refuse to exercise that jurisdiction upon a finding that
4the appellate waiver is valid.  Id.  We make a de novo determination as to the validity of
Hough’s appellate waiver.  United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
III.
Hough raises two issues on appeal.  First, he contends that the District Court erred
in refusing to impose a sentence split between incarceration and home detention.  While
he does not contest that the statutory mandatory minimum for a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2) is five years’ imprisonment, he argues that the District Court erred by
interpreting the statutory term “imprisoned” as referring exclusively to incarceration and
not home detention.  Second, Hough asserts that the District Court violated his
constitutional right to procreate and associate with his children by imposing in Hough’s
supervised release terms a condition prohibiting him from having unsupervised visits with
children under the age of eighteen.  In response to Hough’s arguments, the Government
asserts that the appellate waiver provision in the plea agreement precludes Hough from
raising these issues.  Alternatively, the Government maintains Hough’s claims are without
merit.  We conclude that the appellate waiver is valid and therefore do not reach the
merits of Hough’s claims.
This Court will find an appellate waiver to be valid “if entered into knowingly and
voluntarily,” provided that the resulting waiver does not “work a miscarriage of justice.” 
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562-63 (3d Cir. 2001).  We approach this
determination in three steps.  See Jackson, 523 F.3d at 243-44.  First, we analyze whether
5the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the appellate waiver.  Id. at 243.  If
so, our attention then turns to the scope of the appellate waiver, looking specifically at the
applicability of any exceptions set forth in the waiver.  Id. at 244.  Finally, where the
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily entered into the waiver and no enumerated
exceptions allow the appeal, we examine whether invoking the waiver would result in a
“miscarriage of justice.”  Id.  Although this Court has chosen not to attach a specific
definition to “miscarriage of justice,” we have included several factors to guide our
analysis.  Prior to “relieving the defendant of the waiver,” we consider “[t]he clarity of
the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing
guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact
of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant
acquiesced in the result.”  Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563 (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257
F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)) (internal quotations omitted).  With these analytical
principles, we turn to Hough’s appellate waiver.
First, Hough does not contest that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into the
appellate waiver.  Second, neither of the two issues Hough raises on appeal fall into one
of the three exceptions to the appellate waiver.  The waiver provision of the plea
agreement allows Hough to directly appeal his conviction or sentence only if the
Government first appeals the sentence, the sentence exceeds the statutory limit as
indicated in the United States Code, or the sentence unreasonably exceeds the federal
6Guidelines range.  This appeal was initiated by Hough, not the Government; thus, the first
exception is inapplicable.  The remaining two exceptions pertain to Hough challenging
the length of his sentence.  Hough does not dispute the length of the statutory five-year
mandatory minimum, but rather takes issue with the “manner” of serving that sentence
since the District Court dismissed his request for home detention.  Such an assertion does
not fit into any waiver exception.  Additionally, Hough’s constitutional challenge to a
term of his supervised release does not question the length of the District Court’s
sentence.  Therefore, because Hough’s sixty-month sentence of imprisonment does not
exceed the statutory maximum of twenty years, nor does it unreasonably exceed the range
provided in the federal Guidelines, none of the appellate waiver exceptions apply.
Finally, enforcing the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice.  As for
Hough’s split-sentence argument, we do not find that the District Court’s refusal to grant
home detention in the face of a statutory mandatory five-year minimum amounts to one of
those “unusual circumstance[s]” that would nullify an otherwise valid waiver.  Khattak,
273 F.3d at 562.  Regarding Hough’s constitutional challenge to a condition of his
supervised release, enforcing a waiver that results in the infringement upon one’s
constitutional rights certainly may amount to a miscarriage of justice.  However, we do
not construe the term of Hough’s supervised release to bring about such harm.
Defendants convicted of crimes similar to Hough’s may “lose custody of their
children or have restrictions placed on their parental rights.”  United States v. Loy, 237
7F.3d 251, 269 (3d Cir. 2001).  Nevertheless, such interference with the familial
relationship must be supported by evidence “that children are potentially in danger from
their parents.”  Id. at 269-70.  Where a sentencing court has not indicated that it intended
a supervised release condition restricting a defendant’s contact with children under
eighteen to extend to that defendant’s own children, we will interpret the condition as
applying only to the children of others.  Id. at 270.  In this case, there is no indication that
the District Court intended the supervised release condition to apply to Hough’s own
family, including any children he may have during his supervised release term.  We will
presume that the District Court intended the order to apply only to the minor children of
other people.  Accordingly, enforcing the appellate waiver will not result in a miscarriage
of justice.
IV.
For the reasons discussed, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
